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Footnotes
1. See R. v. Kowall, 108 C.C.C. (3d) 481, 1996 CarswellOnt 3091
(Can. Ont.); R. v. Hayward, 86 C.C.C. (3d) 193, 1993 Cars-
wellOnt 1162 (Can. Ont.).
2. See R. v. Griffith, 2013 ONCA 510, 2013 CarswellOnt 10984
(Can. Ont.).
3. See R. v. Dhanaswar, 2016 ONCA 229, 2016 CarswellOnt 4357
(Can. Ont.).
4. See Director of Public Prosecutions v. GK, [2014] IECCA 35 (Ir.).
In In re L and B (Children), [2013] UKSC 8 [¶ 16], [¶ 19] (appeal
taken from Eng.), the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
indicated that it “has long been the law that a judge is entitled to
reverse his decision at any time before his order is drawn up and
perfected. . . . Thus there is jurisdiction to change one’s mind
up until the order is drawn up and perfected. Under the [Civil
Procedure Rules] (rule 40.2(2)(b)), an order is now perfected by
being sealed by the court. There is no jurisdiction to change one’s
mind thereafter unless the court has an express power to vary its
own previous order. The proper route of challenge is by appeal.
On any view, therefore, in the particular circumstances of this
case, the judge did have power to change her mind. The question
is whether she should have exercised it.”
5. 2015 ONCA 754, 2015 CarswellOnt 16819 (Can. Ont.).
6. Id. ¶ 24.
7. Id. ¶ 32. The reference to the “Palmer criteria” is a reference to R.
v. Palmer, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759 (Can.). Palmer is the leading
authority in Canada on the introduction of “fresh evidence” on
appeal. The criteria set out in Palmer for the introduction of such
evidence has been adopted to determining if fresh evidence
should be introduced at trial after a guilty verdict has been
entered but before sentence has been imposed. The criteria as set
out in Palmer are: “(1) The evidence should generally not be
admitted if, by due diligence, it could have been adduced at trial
provided that this general principle will not be applied as strictly
in a criminal case as in civil cases. . . . (2) The evidence must be
relevant in the sense that it bears upon a decisive or potentially
decisive issue in the trial. (3) The evidence must be credible in the
sense that it is reasonably capable of belief. (4) It must be such
that if believed it could reasonably, when taken with the other evi-
dence adduced at trial, be expected to have affected the result.”
[1980] 1 S.C.R. 759, ¶ 22. 
8. See Cunningham v. Lilles, 2010 SCC 10, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 331, 
¶ 19 (Can.); R. v. H. (E.), [1997] O.J. No. 1110, 1997 CarswellOnt
1262, ¶ 11 (Can. Ont.); R. v. Robichaud, 2011 NBCA 112, 2012
CarswellNB 289, ¶ 4 (Can. N.B.).
9. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 848, ¶ 75 (Can.). In a recent decision from the
United Kingdom, reference was made to a court becoming functus
once the order was “sealed”; see Samara v. MBI & Partners UK
Ltd. (t/a MBI International & Partners Co.), [2016] EWHC 441
(QB) [¶ 60].
It is clear that a Canadian judge can change a ruling or deci-sion. For instance, it is well settled in Canada that a trialjudge can reconsider a verdict of guilty in a criminal trial
based upon the introduction of “fresh evidence”1 before sen-
tence is imposed2 and that an appellate court can subsequently
decide an issue it had failed to address in its initial judgment3
or amend “an order already passed and perfected.”4
In R. v. J.A., after convicting the accused of a sexual offence,
the trial judge received a letter from the victim’s grandfather
indicating that the victim had told him that there were more
sexual incidents involved than he had described in his testi-
mony.5 The trial judge refused to reopen the trial and vacate
his verdict or to declare a mistrial. On appeal, the Ontario
Court of Appeal noted that “a trial judge who has made a find-
ing of guilt on disputed facts has the authority to vacate the
adjudication of guilt at any time before the imposition of sen-
tence or other final disposition, but such authority should be
exercised only in exceptional circumstances and in the clear-
est of cases.”6 The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial
judge’s “reasons on the mistrial motion confirm that he appre-
ciated and correctly applied the principles governing mistrial
applications and the Palmer criteria for the admission of fresh
evidence in the context of the whole of the evidence led at
trial.” It concluded, “His discretionary decision to dismiss the
mistrial motion is neither clearly wrong nor based on an erro-
neous principle. I therefore would reject this ground of
appeal.”7
IMPLIED JURISDICTION
It has been held that the doctrine of “implied jurisdiction”
or “jurisdiction by necessary implication” allows a Canadian
court to “vary one of its own orders in order to correct clerical
mistakes or errors arising from an accidental slip or omission
or in order to properly reflect the intention of the court.”8
This power has been extended in Canada to the point that
it exists even after a court’s formal order has been filed and
issued. Thus, in Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects, the
Supreme Court of Canada stated:
The general rule that a final decision of a court cannot
be reopened derives from the decision of the English
Court of Appeal in Re St. Nazaire Co. (1879), 12 Ch. D.
88. The basis for it was that the power to rehear was
transferred by the Judicature Acts to the appellate divi-
sion. The rule applied only after the formal judgment
had been drawn up, issued and entered, and was subject
to two exceptions:
1. where there had been a slip in drawing it up,
and,
2. where there was an error in expressing the man-
ifest intention of the court.9
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10. See R. v. Crocker, [2012] N.J. No. 266, 2012 CarswellNfld 248, 
¶ 14 (Can. Nfld.).
11. [1995] 4 S.C.R. 707, ¶ 29 (Can.).
12. 2016 BCCA 97, 2016 CarswellBC 522, ¶ 22 (Can. B.C.).
13. See R. v. Lessard, 30 C.C.C. (2d) 70, 1976 CarswellOnt 8, ¶ 12
(Can. Ont.).
14. 2016 ABCA 20, 2016 CarswellAlta 140 (Can. Alta.).
15. 2016 ONCA 53, 2016 CarswellOnt 574 (Can. Ont.).
16. Arens, 2016 ABCA 20, ¶ 8.
17. Id. ¶ 10.
18. Id. ¶ 13. The reference to “Grant analysis” is a reference to R. v.
Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 (Can.), the leading deci-
sion in Canada on the test to be applied in determining whether
evidence should be excluded if a violation of the Canadian Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms has been established by an accused per-
son. The test involves a three-stage analysis: “(1) the seriousness
of the Charter-infringing state conduct (admission may send the
message the justice system condones serious state misconduct),
(2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of
the accused (admission may send the message that individual
rights count for little), and (3) society’s interest in the adjudica-
tion of the case on its merits.” 2009 SCC 32, ¶ 71.
19. Arens, 2016 ABCA 20, ¶ 2.
20. Id. ¶¶ 18-19.
21. Id. ¶ 26.
22. Id. ¶ 27.
However, it has also been held that the jurisdiction con-
ferred by implication is a limited one that cannot be turned
into “judicial authority to requisition a statutory power with-
held by the legislature.”10 As pointed out by the Supreme
Court of Canada in R. v. Adams, a “court has a limited power to
reconsider and vary its judgment disposing of the case as long
as the court is not functus.”11 In McKenzie v. McKenzie, it was
held that a court is not functus when a variation of an order is
required to correct “an error in expressing the manifest inten-
tion of the court.”12
Finally, it has been suggested that vacating a verdict of
guilty by a trial judge “is a power which . . . should only be
exercised in exceptional circumstances where its exercise is
clearly called for.”13
In this edition’s column, I review two recent Canadian
Court of Appeal decisions that have considered the issue of
when and how a trial judge should reconsider a decision or
verdict rendered: R. v. Arens14 and R. v. O’Shea.15
R. v. ARENS
In Arens, the accused was convicted of the offences of
impaired driving causing death and dangerous driving causing
death. 
Before trial, a voir dire was held to determine if the arrest of
the accused contravened the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Constitution Act 1982 (the Charter) and whether the
evidence obtained as a result of the alleged breaches should be
admitted or excluded. The evidence in issue consisted of the
observations by officers made after the accused was arrested
and video recordings of him taken at the police station (the
“impugned evidence”). 
The Crown conceded that section 8 [unreasonable search
and seizure] and section 9 [arbitrary detention] of the Charter
had been violated. The Alberta Court of Appeal indicated that
these “concessions were made on the basis that the arresting
officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the
appellant and to make an evidentiary breath demand.”16 The
sole issue in contention was whether the “impugned evidence”
should be excluded.
The trial judge accepted the Crown’s concession and ruled
as follows:
The arresting officer, when he told Mr. Arens to get
out of the truck, did not have evidence of impairment
attributable to alcohol that was required to make the
arrest. Thus, it was both an arbitrary detention and a vio-
lation of Mr. Arens’s rights to be secure against unrea-
sonable search or seizure.17
However, the trial judge concluded that the “impugned evi-
dence” was admissible. 
The evidence called on the voir dire was admitted in the trial
proper. The accused was subsequently convicted of both
charges. In convicting the accused, and without advising coun-
sel in advance, the trial judge reversed his earlier voir dire rul-
ing, holding that the Charter had not been breached:
It turns out that I was wrong on my Grant analysis of
section 24(2) of the Charter, in the alternative I find that
because there was a lawful arrest based on the evidence
of reasonable and probable grounds led during the voir
dire, there is no Charter breach to analyze.18
The accused appealed from conviction. The Alberta Court
of Appeal described the issue raised by the appeal in the fol-
lowing manner:
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether there
was a miscarriage of justice as a result of a lack of pro-
cedural fairness related to Charter rulings in a voir dire
subsequently reversed in the course of the trial judge’s
reasons for conviction, and adverse inferences he made
about the appellant’s failure to provide a breath sample.19
A majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal indicated that
failing “to provide an opportunity to present full submissions
is an error of law reviewable on a standard of correctness. . . .
While procedural fairness is usually associated with adminis-
trative law, it applies with full force in the criminal law con-
text.”20
The majority noted that the trial judge had “the authority to
reverse his voir dire ruling as he was not functus officio.”21
However, the majority also held that the trial judge’s approach
“has the potential of bringing the administration of justice into
disrepute. The consequences of these four convictions are sig-
nificant and scrupulous adherence to procedural fairness is
essential in such circumstances.”22
The majority concluded that the trial judge should have
given counsel notice of his reversal decision: 
The trial judge should have given the appellant rea-
sonable notice of his decision to reverse himself on the
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23. Id. ¶¶ 28-29.
24. Id. ¶ 52.
25. 2016 ONCA 53, 2016 CarswellOnt 574, ¶ 5 (Can. Ont.). 
26. Id.
27. Id. 
28. See Lymer v. Jonsson, 2016 ABCA 32, 2016 CarswellAlta 134, ¶ 3
(Can. Alta.).
29. In Hafichuk-Walkin v. BCE Inc., 2016 MBCA 32, 2016 Carswell-
Man 75, ¶ 39 (Can. Man.), it was noted that the “integrity of the
administration of justice requires finality in litigation. The evils
that multiplicity of proceedings give rise to are duplicative litiga-
tion, potential inconsistent results, undue costs and inconsistent
proceedings.”
30. 2016 ONCA 105, 2016 CarswellOnt 1615, ¶ 11 (Can. Ont.).
31. In In re L and B (Children), [2013] UKSC 8 [¶ 46], it was sug-
gested that as “Peter Gibson LJ pointed out in Robinson v Fernsby
[2004] WTLR 257, para 120, judicial tergiversation is not to be
encouraged. On the other hand, it takes courage and intellectual
honesty to admit one’s mistakes. The best safeguard against hav-
ing to do so is a fully and properly reasoned judgment in the first
place.”
Charter breaches. Doing so would have provided the
appellant the opportunity to fully re-argue whether the
police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the
appellant. Given the Crown’s concessions and the voir
dire ruling, this opportunity was essential.
As noted above, the trial judge, having reversed him-
self on the Charter issues, said even in the absence of the
impugned evidence, there was a sufficient basis for con-
viction. However, the trial judge made extensive refer-
ence to the following impugned evidence in the course
of his reasons for conviction. First, he referred to Cor-
poral Scarrott and Constable Tremblay’s testimony about
their post-arrest observations of the appellant at the
scene. Second, as regards events at the RCMP detach-
ment, the trial judge made note of Constable Tremblay’s
testimony, the breathalyzer technician’s testimony, Con-
stable Brown’s evidence, the video recording and the evi-
dence of the paramedics. In other words, a significant
portion of the evidence the trial judge relied on was from
the evidence that followed arrest. Although he said that
he would have convicted on the other evidence, it is not
obvious why he then referred to, and seems to have
relied upon, much of the impugned evidence.23
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Martin held that the trial
judge’s “change of mind was of no consequence”: 
He initially decided that the evidence was admissible on
the understanding that there had been breaches of the
appellant’s [section] 8 and [section] 9 rights. His ultimate
finding that there had not been a breach had no impact
on that ruling. In either scenario, the evidence was
admissible. This was not a situation where the trial judge
reversed himself on the admissibility of evidence.24
R. v. O’SHEA
In O’Shea, the accused pleaded guilty to the offence of pos-
session of child pornography. At a pretrial conference, the pre-
siding judge indicated “that a proposed 45 day sentence would
be ‘reasonable.’”25 At the sentence hearing, the same judge
imposed a period of one year imprisonment. The accused
appealed from the sentence imposed, seeking to have the
Court of Appeal reduce it to a period of 45 days.
The appeal was dismissed. The Ontario Court of Appeal
indicated that it could not “be suggested that the trial judge was
not entitled to impose a sentence of one year imprisonment”:
Even accepting that the appellant’s counsel’s notation
written at the first pre-trial (a pre-trial conducted by the
same judge who ultimately accepted the guilty plea and
imposed the sentence) to the effect that a proposed 45
day sentence would be ‘reasonable’, it was entirely per-
missible for the trial judge to change her mind once she
had seen the evidence of the volume and nature of the
child pornography possessed by the appellant.26
The Court of Appeal felt that this was reflected in the
exchange between the trial judge and defence counsel imme-
diately after she imposed sentence:
THE COURT: Any questions [counsel]?
[Counsel]: Uhm, other than the fact, Your Honour
that there had been some judicial pre-trials with respect
to resolving the matters, I take it Your Honour was aware
of that? Is that correct?
THE COURT: I may have been aware of that, but I
haven’t viewed the videos and I haven’t seen the pictures
when the position was given. There’s a big difference
between [Mr. B.’s] case where it’s young adults, no, I’m
sorry, older teens, and what was seen on those particular
pictures, images and videos.27
CONCLUSION
It is clear that Canadian trial judges can reverse themselves.
However, it is also clear that the “rules of natural justice
require courts to provide an opportunity to be heard to those
who will be affected by a decision” and that a failure “to pro-
vide an opportunity to be heard is fatal to a decision.”28
In the context of reversing ourselves, great caution is
required. Finality plays an important role in the criminal and
civil trial process.29 As pointed out by the Ontario Court of
Appeal in Chitsabesan v. Yuhendran, although “a judge is not
functus officio where the order has not been signed and entered
and therefore retains jurisdiction over a matter, the instances
in which it might be in the interests of justice to withdraw rea-
sons of the court and rehear the case on the merits will be
‘rare.’”30
We should try to avoid appearing to be making tentative
decisions that we subsequently change. A lax approach to
finality in decision making has the potential to bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. The conflict is always
between finality and justice.31
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Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
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page of the Canadian Association of Provincial
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Court Judges) for the Canadian Provincial
Judges’ Journal. Judge Gorman’s work has been widely pub-
Editors, COURT REVIEW:
The article by Wechsler et al., “The Impact of Forensic vs.
Social-Science Evidence on Judicial Decisions to Grant a Writ
of Habeas Corpus” (COURT REVIEW, Vol. 51, #4) contains a
serious, fundamental problem. Starting with the title, the
authors talk throughout of “social science evidence.” That
would lead a reader quite reasonably to expect a presentation
of a contest between, on the one hand, testimony about
research on mistaken identity (e.g., by Elizabeth Loftus), and,
on the other, perhaps DNA evidence as “forensic” evidence. But
NO social science evidence is ever used in the vignettes presented
to the judges. Although, separately, judges are asked in a survey
about such evidence, their survey responses are not linked to
their vignette-based decisions about evidence. The authors’
error begins with a failure to define “social science evidence”
and in their saying (at p. 161) that evidence of false confessions
and eyewitness misidentification “fall[s] under the defined
domain of social-science evidence in line with social-psycho-
logical research . . . .” Yes, social psychologists have been the
primary investigators on issues as to false confession and eye-
witness misidentification, but that doesn’t make those topics
themselves (eyewitness misidentification and false confessions,
as evidentiary matters) “social science evidence,” which
instead would be the introduction of social science studies
through citation in briefs, mention in lawyers’ argument, and
in expert witness testimony. To repeat, none of that social sci-
ence evidence is presented in the study vignettes. The result is
that the article is a study only of judges’ reactions to various
kinds of problematic evidence, which it is certainly worthwhile
to study. However, because no social science evidence is pre-
sent in their vignettes, the authors did not test judges’ reactions
to social science evidence. 
Thus the authors’ conclusions about judges’ reactions to
social science evidence cannot stand.
Stephen L. Wasby
Professor of political science emeritus, University at Albany
Eastham, Mass.
L E T T E R S
